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Beyond Exclusion: A Review of Peter J. 
Spiro’s “Beyond Citizenship” 
Jeffrey A. Redding† 
BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER 
GLOBALIZATION 
 By Peter J. Spiro.∗ New York, N.Y.: Oxford University 
Press, 2008. Pp. 163. $27.50. 
  INTRODUCTION: AMERICA THE EXCLUSIVE?   
Few people would have predicted the precipitous decline in 
power and prestige that the twenty-first century has dealt the 
United States. Humbled by the surprise attacks on 9/11, humi-
liated by its poor performance in both the Afghanistan and Iraq 
wars, and now hobbled by a staggering financial crisis, the 
United States has suffered through its most devastating decade 
since the Civil War. A once-admired nation seems to have gone 
off the tracks, and many people have now decided it is best to 
keep their distance—politically, physically, and otherwise.1 
 
†  Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. For helpful 
comments and discussion on earlier versions of this Review, I would like to 
thank Adrienne Davis, Rohit De, Chad Flanders, Clark Gard, Doni Ge-
wirtzman, and Karen Petroski. Dallin Merrill and Robbie Hinz both provided 
very helpful research assistance for this Review. Of course, all errors of fact 
and judgment remain mine alone. This Review is dedicated to Strand Books-
tore for providing shelter from Manhattan monsoons, both celestial and hu-
man. Copyright © 2010 by Jeffrey A. Redding. 
∗  Charles R. Weiner Professor of Law, Temple University–Beasley 
School of Law; B.A., 1982, Harvard College; J.D., 1987, University of Virginia. 
 1. See generally PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, AMERICA’S IMAGE 
SLIPS, BUT ALLIES SHARE U.S. CONCERNS OVER IRAN, HAMAS (2006), available 
at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252 (discussing how in-
ternational perceptions of the United States have declined); see also generally 
PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, MUSLIM DISAPPOINTMENT: OBAMA MORE 
POPULAR ABROAD THAN AT HOME, GLOBAL IMAGE OF U.S. CONTINUES TO 
BENEFIT 1–10 (2010), available at http://pewglobal.org/2010/06/17/obama-
more-popular-abroad-than-at-home/ (demonstrating that while favorable 
views of the United States have increased in many parts of the world after 
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How quickly things seem to have changed since 1996, when 
it appeared that the entire world wanted a piece of the Ameri-
can super pie. Just over a dozen years ago, Congress passed 
draconian legislation severely cutting back on the numerous 
benefits and rights that noncitizen immigrants (including resi-
dent aliens) had previously enjoyed. These cuts came in re-
sponse to popular anxiety about “uncontrolled” immigration 
and its allegedly deleterious effects on the nation.2 At the time, 
it seemed to many people that the United States was a place of 
too much opportunity and hope, and the object of desire for too 
many people. 
Enter the new millennium. In a disorienting world where 
many non-Americans (and Americans) no longer recognize or 
identify with the United States, Peter J. Spiro’s Beyond Citi-
zenship: American Identity After Globalization intervenes with 
a timely and provocative discussion of the issues, problems, and 
dilemmas that accompany twenty-first century American iden-
tity, and its articulation in U.S. citizenship law. Spiro justifies 
his focus on citizenship law as a metric for national identity 
from the outset. He argues, “Before one asks what it means to be 
an American, one must ask who is an American. . . . [N]othing 
is more constitutive of the community than its membership 
practices.”3 (p. 4). 
In 163 pages of learned but accessible text, Spiro’s rich and 
erudite work describes the history and future trajectory of key 
aspects of U.S. citizenship law, American national identity, and 
their interaction. Spiro’s work is particularly interested in giv-
ing a descriptive account of citizenship law’s contributions to 
the “eroding foundation of the national community” (p. 10). And 
while most of the broad themes that Spiro engages with in his 
book are intriguing, he makes a number of particular argu-
ments in his work concerning the similarities between religious 
and national community that are especially provocative.  
As I will argue in this Review, however, Spiro’s arguments 
about religious and national communities’ shared need to ex-
 
Obama’s election, negative views of the United States persist or have in-
creased in other parts of the world). 
 2. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 402, 110 Stat. 2105, 2262–65 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 601–617 (2006)). This federal law followed an even harsher 1994 
California initiative, Proposition 187, which denied undocumented immigrants 
crucial welfare benefits, going so far as to exclude even the children of these 
immigrants from public schools. 
 3. Emphasis in original. 
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clude outsiders and also insist upon internal conformity in or-
der to become “meaningful” communities are often quite sim-
plistic. This is especially so where Spiro premises his argu-
ments on unsupportable generalizations about religion writ 
large, and under-theorizes the foundational ideas of “communi-
ty” and “meaningfulness.” Indeed, when critically examined, 
these problems undermine his linked accounts concerning na-
tional community, including his account of how an overinclu-
sive U.S. citizenship regime has seriously diluted American na-
tional identity. 
Part I of this Review outlines the six chapters of Spiro’s 
book, identifying his central assumptions and claims.  
Part II then highlights and critiques two important as-
sumptions about the nature of religion that Spiro utilizes to il-
lustrate and give color to his claims about exclusive citizenship 
as a prerequisite for meaningful national community. In par-
ticular, this Part argues that Spiro’s claims that meaningful re-
ligious communities must be hostile to outsiders and must have 
conformity among its insiders ignore countervailing real-world 
religious experience. This Part discusses examples drawn from 
the religious and political experiences of Hindu, Muslim, and 
Christian communities. 
When critically unraveled, Spiro’s discussion of religion 
starts to undermine many of his larger arguments about the 
necessity of a vigilant U.S. national citizenship regime to sus-
tain a meaningful American national identity. Part III proble-
matizes these larger claims by connecting Part II’s discussion of 
religious community to national community, and demonstrates, 
contra Spiro, that vibrant national community does not depend 
on internal conformity. As I conclude in this Part, Spiro ulti-
mately undermines his ambitious and thought-provoking ar-
gument connecting religious and national communities by re-
lying on a narrow and inaccurate account of what counts as a 
real or meaningful “religion” or “nation” in the first place. 
I.  SPIRO’S PROJECT   
Beyond Citizenship self-consciously presents itself as a de-
scriptive and fatalistic project. It is possible to read the book as 
a lament over the loss of America’s “former glories” (p. 36) 
when it was “at the top of the heap of human history” (p. 162). 
But Spiro insists that his work “is not intended to kindle cor-
rectives[,] . . . [rather] a major theme [is] the irreversibility of 
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citizenship’s decline”4 (p. 162). Emphasizing his work’s non-
normative, descriptive orientation, Spiro argues the “political 
unpalatability of [his] thesis across the ideological spectrum” 
(p. 6), thereby distancing his project from extant political agen-
das from the outset. 
What could be so explosive a diagnosis of the contemporary 
American situation that few American politicians or policy-
makers, of whatever mainstream stripe, would endorse it? For 
one thing, Spiro argues that U.S. citizenship has become easily 
obtainable and, as a result of its nonexclusivity, has become 
largely meaningless in today’s world. According to Spiro, such a 
proposition about citizenship’s actual irrelevance is anathema 
to both conservatives and liberals in the United States, since 
both are invested in a continuing role for the state (i.e. the U.S. 
government). “Conservatives transparently center the state as 
the keeper of social order and national security,” and “most 
American progressives are also nationalists, seeing the state as 
the guardian of liberty and a primary agent of redistribution” 
(p. 6). As a result, both conservatives and liberals believe the 
rules that govern state membership are “paramount institu-
tional virtues” (p. 6), which is why both conservatives and lib-
erals continue to fight over the laws that define citizenship.  
In contrast, Spiro argues that this conservative/liberal ob-
session with the legal prerequisites of citizenship, and also citi-
zenship itself, is outdated and naive. For Spiro, U.S. citizen-
ship, to the extent that it is supposed to serve as a formal 
marker of devotion to the national project, has become (in par-
ticular) overinclusive. This overinclusiveness muddies and di-
lutes the meaning of American national identity and communi-
ty, taking away from their “sentimental” (p. 30), “meaningful” 
(p. 33), and “real” (p. 36) possibilities. Belying his purely de-
scriptive ambitions, this represents an incredible loss for Spiro, 
as the United States not only “has offered the best that the na-
tion-state can offer” (p. 162), but has also been “at the top of the 
heap of human history” (p. 162). Thus, according to Spiro, 
“[t]here is much to grieve in America’s dissipation” (p. 162). 
Spiro never fleshes out with sufficient detail what makes 
an identity or community “real” or “meaningful.” He nonethe-
less links the meaningfulness of a community (identity) to the 
maintenance of high and thick boundaries between the com-
munity and others, repeatedly reciting truisms like “[e]xclusion 
 
 4. Emphasis added. 
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is a premise to community,” and “inclusion dilutes identity” (p. 
157). And, with respect to the United States in particular, 
“[t]he more inclusive America becomes as a community, the less 
special it becomes as a location of identity, of differentness” (p. 
157). Ultimately, Spiro’s thoughts on all this can be summed up 
in his maxim: “Once everyone is an American, no one is an 
American.”5 (p. 52). 
This loss of a distinct “American-ness,” according to Spiro, 
makes U.S. citizenship a less attractive option to potential re-
cipients.6 Furthermore, the erosion of meaningful national 
“communal bonds” (p. 31) makes U.S. citizenship more legalis-
tic (p. 31) and less significant for existing citizens. As a result, 
it is easier and emotionally cheaper for these citizens to hand 
this citizenship out to those who are not yet citizens. The liber-
al distribution of citizenship that results reinforces the dissi-
pating-of-meaningfulness effect that led to this easy handing-
out in the first place (p. 31). Consequently, U.S. citizenship and 
American identity have experienced—and will inevitably con-
tinue to experience—a mutually reinforcing decline in impor-
tance. Again, this is regrettable for Spiro, as “America’s dissi-
pation” (p. 162) means the dissipation of great strides in 
“security, economic and social innovation, and . . . individual 
dignity” (p. 162). 
The first four chapters of Spiro’s work are devoted to a de-
tailed demonstration of the increasing legal, material, social, 
and psychological irrelevance of modern-day U.S. citizenship. 
In Chapter 1, “Born American,” Spiro demonstrates how trans-
national mobility and the historical liberalization of territorial 
birthright citizenship rules has led to a situation where a per-
son’s physical presence in the United States no longer tightly 
corresponds to that person’s being or feeling like an “Ameri-
can.” As a result, there are nowadays many people who are 
what Spiro terms “happenstance Americans” (p. 19). This group 
includes people who have been born in the United States, but, 
utilizing advances in travel and communication technologies, 
“subsequently move to [and settle in] their parents’ [non-U.S.] 
homeland” (p. 23). It also includes those who remain within the 
territorial boundaries of the United States, but “pursue their 
 
 5. Emphasis in original. 
 6. Spiro argues that modern-day U.S. citizenship qua citizenship is no 
longer something that many people care deeply about: “The real prize is legal 
residency, not citizenship. It’s all about the green card, not the naturalization 
certificate.” (p. 159). 
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entire lives within their diasporic communities” (p. 23). This 
“happenstance” group also includes those “lucky enough to be 
born during [foreign] Mommy’s three-year stint in California” 
(p. 23), or those who have been born to an American parent 
abroad and who have chosen to remain settled overseas (as-
suming that the citizen parent had spent at least five years res-
ident in the United States before their child’s birth) (p. 26). 
Chapter 1 ends on the fatalistic note that sounds through-
out the book, namely that the lack of a tight correspondence be-
tween those who possess U.S. citizenship papers and those who 
possess “sentimental” (p. 30) ties to the U.S. has led to an ero-
sion of the meaning and consequences of citizenship. As citizen-
ship becomes more of a license-like “status” (p. 27) than an 
emotional or existential bond to a shared national way-of-being, 
existing citizens find themselves with fewer and fewer reasons 
to refuse endowing others with this status. This, in turn, leads 
to more and more legalistic citizens, weaker and weaker bonds 
between citizens, and so forth, to the point where “no [policy] 
fix is available” (p. 32). 
In Chapter 2, “Made American,” Spiro explains how U.S. 
naturalization rules have become overinclusive. The result is “a 
citizenry that no longer coincides with any organic association” 
(p. 34), thereby diminishing “meaningful community” (p. 35). 
The present naturalization regime requires, for most persons, 
five years of (legal) residence as a permanent resident alien, on-
ly half of which must be satisfied by actual physical presence.7 
Furthermore, Spiro notes that this territorially-premised re-
gime is based on the questionable assumption that “by being 
present, one will become a member of the national community 
as a matter of fact and assimilate whatever characteristics 
makes up the national identity” (p. 37). Conversely, Spiro diag-
noses here an increasing prevalence of ethnic enclaves and 
global diasporic connections, both of which lead him to wonder 
whether the people situated in these enclaves and diasporas ac-
tually participate in “[mainstream] contacts of employment, 
civic association, education, and the media, [and thereby] un-
derstand the American identity and become a part of it” (p. 38). 
In Chapter 3, “Not Only American,” Spiro traces the histo-
ry of legal prohibitions against dual (or plural) citizenship in 
American legal history and the eventual collapse of these pro-
hibitions. As Spiro cleverly puts it, “If America can be reduced 
 
 7. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2006). In addition, citizenship requires a passing 
familiarity with American history and the English language.  
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to a punctuation mark, the hyphen is being replaced by the 
ampersand. It is no longer unusual or problematic to hold more 
than one citizenship.” (p. 67). In this chapter, notably, Spiro 
makes (somewhat) clear what troubles him about modern citi-
zenship and its detachment from meaningful community—even 
if nothing can be done about it.8 Here we find some (yet not 
enough) fleshing out of what Spiro considers to be real citizen-
ship and real community, though mostly only in the negative. 
Spiro declares that real citizenship does not include “citizen-
ship[s] of convenience” (p. 76) where, for example, citizenship is 
obtained merely “for the purpose of securing access to faster 
passport inspection lines at airports” (p. 76) or European Union 
employment opportunities (p. 69).9 More affirmatively, though 
abstractly, Spiro contends that real citizenship seems to carry 
duties and obligations, not just rights (p. 76). These affirmative 
obligations contribute to something Spiro calls a “meaningful 
locus of community” (p. 73).10 
In Chapter 4, “Take It or Leave It American,” Spiro con-
cludes his discussion of historical and contemporary aspects of 
U.S. citizenship law with one of his most important claims, 
namely that U.S. citizenship qua citizenship brings little extra 
added value in today’s world, at least in comparison to the pro-
verbial “green card” (p. 159).11 
 
 8. According to Spiro, “America was once in a position to offer naturali-
zation on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.” (p. 74). In today’s more competitive world, 
however, “[t]he United States may no longer dictate the terms of admission, or 
do so only at the peril of deterring a significant population of permanent resi-
dents from becoming full members of the polity and corroding the representa-
tive democratic process as a result” (p. 74).  
 9. Perhaps tying the “meaningfulness” of a community to its members’ 
willingness to sacrifice for each other, Spiro writes, “A citizenship that denotes 
nothing more than place of birth or parental status will not bear the burdens 
of redistributive sacrifice. I will not fight for someone who shares membership 
merely because his parents were passing through when he was born, nor will I 
be inclined to share my paycheck with him.” (p. 31). If that is what Spiro is 
doing in this passage, however, one might wonder whether violence and cash 
should be the metrics by which one measures meaningfulness. Elsewhere, Spi-
ro engages in further (albeit vague) discussion about the inability of contempo-
rary U.S. citizenship to “extract” anything from citizens (p. 82). 
 10. In this chapter, Spiro highlights how countries, acting in their eco-
nomic self-interest, extend citizenship to members of their diasporas (p. 71). It 
is not clear, however, whether Spiro thinks this is inconsistent with “meaning-
ful” citizenship. 
 11. Spiro goes so far as to argue here that, with respect to that most-
heralded right—the right to vote—there are many other avenues (e.g. finan-
cial donations, membership in civil society and labor organizations, and the 
votes of their citizen relatives) through which noncitizens can influence the 
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In Chapters 5 (“American Defined”) and 6 (“Beyond Ameri-
can”), Spiro moves into a more theoretical and future-oriented 
discussion of U.S. citizenship and state-premised citizenship. 
Spiro dismisses the possibility of a future “global super-state,” 
but predicts continuing globalization and “demotion [of the 
state] in the scheme of human organization.” He then poses the 
question: “What becomes of citizenship after the state?”12 (p. 
110). In this respect, Spiro explores how nonstate entities, such 
as religious communities and corporations, are increasingly 
performing functions for their “citizens” that states once 
claimed a monopoly over. These include the provision of securi-
ty, education, family law, and social welfare. Given this migra-
tion of functions and powers from the state to the nonstate,13 
Spiro here thinks through some of the “new citizenship” issues 
which are emerging in the twenty-first century. 
As to these issues, Spiro notes that the citizenship rights 
and norms that one typically expects states to abide by may not 
be totally applicable when thinking about citizenship in reli-
gions, tribes, and other “nonstate”14 membership organizations. 
He writes, for example, 
“[I]n the U.S. context, we have seen that nationality will never be 
terminated against an individual’s will. As a background norm, [that] 
seems a useful guide to community conduct. One can easily pose situ-
ations in which [religious] excommunication raises serious justice 
concerns. But our intuition leads us to accept termination in some 
cases, as when the individual acts against core [religious] community 
interests.” (p. 154) (emphasis added). 
Additionally, while “[w]e have seen the trends towards the 
acceptance of plural citizenship . . . [t]hat may work for some 
 
political process. Indeed, while “it is not hard to construct an account in which 
[noncitizens] lack a political voice,” according to Spiro this account would only 
“fetishize[ ] the ballot” (p. 91). Ultimately, then, “[f ]or those who don’t other-
wise identify with the American community, it may not be worth compromis-
ing their identity,” while “[f ]or others, it simply isn’t worth the bureaucratic 
hassle” (p. 81). This is the case even though, as Spiro also discusses, modern-
day U.S. citizenship itself brings no obligations with it, other than jury ser-
vice, that noncitizen, territorially-present residents do not also bear. 
 12. Alternatively, and less dramatically, Spiro also asks what might re-
place citizenship in “the transition to an order in which the state is not su-
preme” (p. 138). 
 13. This includes, importantly, the potential for justice and injustice (p. 
148). 
 14. I will challenge this characterization of religions, tribes, etc., and 
demonstrate how Spiro’s use of this characterization allows him to make un-
helpful generalizations about the internal coherence of both religious and na-
tional communities. See infra Parts II–III. 
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nonstate entities but not for others. Religion obviously doesn’t 
allow for multiple affiliations” (p. 155). 
Spiro here is less interested in making specific recommen-
dations as to which state-premised citizenship norms should 
apply to nonstate entities like religious communities (or vice-
versa), than he is in merely highlighting these emerging and 
important citizenship/membership questions. For Spiro, these 
questions are unavoidable and must be confronted in a world 
where liberal entry and exit citizenship rules have made Amer-
ican national identity largely meaningless. Indeed, given the 
thinness of contemporary American national identity, Spiro be-
lieves Americans will inevitably look for meaningful community 
elsewhere (p. 157). That place will most likely be in privatized 
communities, such as religious ones, which maintain strict 
membership norms. “[R]ules . . . that set high, sometimes insu-
perable, barriers to community entry are a part of what 
makes . . . communities strong. . . . Exclusion is a premise to 
community.” (p. 157). Spiro thus ends his book on the founda-
tional assumptions about community, whether national or reli-
gious, with which he began. 
The next Part demonstrates how Spiro’s beliefs about what 
makes communities meaningful are faulty when it comes to 
contemporary religious communities, especially to the extent 
that they rely on simplistic generalizations about religion writ 
large. 
II.  HOLY CITIZENSHIP   
One of the great strengths of Spiro’s work is his willingness 
to cross disciplinary borders. In this way Spiro is akin to the 
modern-day, citizenship-collecting, global migrant that he de-
scribes in his work. In a legal academy where disciplinary su-
per-specialization is often rewarded, it is refreshing to find an 
author willing to take on family law, sexuality studies, religion, 
ethnicity, and economics in a work devoted to citizenship law. 
For example, when discussing dual citizenship in Chapter 2, 
Spiro begins by noting that “[d]ual citizenship was once 
thought an offense against nature, a strain on a person’s cha-
racter, an immoral status akin to bigamy” (p. 59). He readily 
engages with this and other provocative interdisciplinary anal-
ogies throughout his work. 
Yet if the modern-day migrant can be criticized for having 
few significant attachments or grounded insights as to any of 
the places where she has citizenship, Spiro’s particular inter-
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disciplinary methodology is subject to the same criticism. While 
wide-ranging, Spiro incompletely engages many of the analo-
gies and parallels he uses to illustrate his central claims about 
the nature of community and contemporary American identity. 
This is particularly true with respect to Spiro’s use of examples 
concerning religion and religious communities. This Part focus-
es on this important weakness of Spiro’s work.  
Two aspects of Spiro’s analogies to religious community in 
support of his view of “meaningful” communities are particular-
ly problematic. First, Spiro’s conceptualization of the exclusive 
nature of meaningful religious communities and religious iden-
tification ignores a great deal of countervailing evidence of ro-
bust, inclusive religious communities. Second, and relatedly, 
Spiro’s focus on intercommunal borders works to obscure the 
disagreement and debate that often exists within healthy reli-
gious communities. Both of these critiques are important be-
cause they go to the foundation of Spiro’s parallels between na-
tional and religious identifications. Spiro’s lamentation of the 
erosion of a readily-identifiable American (national) identity is 
premised on a misapprehension of how thriving religious com-
munities often function. Linking both aspects of Spiro’s discus-
sion, then, is a troublesome gloss over the pluralistic nature of 
“community,” religious and otherwise. Unfortunately, this gloss 
leads Spiro to make a number of arguments about the detri-
mental impact of U.S. citizenship law on American national 
identity and community that are not as helpful as they other-
wise could be. 
In what follows, I draw from the religious and political ex-
periences of Hindu, Muslim, and Christian “communities.” 
Each of the communities I discuss has an identifiable political, 
legal, and social salience in its own context. While the examples 
of religious community I use are not small-scale, privatized ent-
ities, this does not make them any less “religious” or less like a 
“community.” This is true whether one examines how members 
of these groups often understand and describe themselves, or 
whether one relies on Spiro’s undertheorized and expansive use 
of these terms. 
A. RELIGIOUS EXCLUSIVITY? 
Spiro’s discussion in Chapter 2 of the parallels between bi-
gamy and dual citizenship does not stop with an exposition of 
  
2010] BOOK REVIEW 39 
 
the closed-mindedness that underlies both legal restrictions.15 
This discussion is only a stepping stone to a larger argument 
about how all sorts of “real” relationships and communities are 
marked by exclusivity and a strict policing of intercommunal 
borders. Thus, while noting that dual (or plural) citizenship is 
here to stay in the contemporary world, Spiro is actually some-
what sympathetic towards the historical argument linking con-
cerns about dual citizenship with the “problem” of bigamy. He 
describes the “logic” of this panicky pairing by saying, “Singu-
lar affiliations inherently have greater meaning than nonexclu-
sive relationships. . . . The contexts of marriage and religion 
present ready examples; because (for the most part) those affil-
iations are exclusive, the resulting bond—the ‘community,’ if 
you will—looms larger on the individual’s horizon.” (p. 59). 
Elsewhere, arguing for the link between a community’s exclu-
sivity and its meaningfulness, Spiro writes, “A world in which 
the ‘us’ and the ‘them’ are rigidly separated is one in which 
both will loom larger. . . . Think sports teams and religions, and 
other institutions that demand exclusive loyalties.” (p. 77). 
Other writers have quite ably contested Spiro’s (and oth-
ers’) simplistic understanding of the meaning and importance 
of polyamory (including bigamy) in peoples’ lives,16 so here I 
will focus on Spiro’s simplistic account of the necessarily exclu-
sive nature of “meaningful” religion and religious communities. 
In this respect, the first thing that should be noted is that 
religions are a diverse bunch. Indeed, each religious community 
that this Part discusses has different internal structures (or 
lack thereof) and different ways of enforcing (or not enforcing) 
membership rules. This diversity highlights an important 
shortcoming in Spiro’s work. His definition and description of 
“community” are undertheorized, and most likely circular and 
underinclusive. Indeed, when Spiro writes that “[e]xclusion is a 
premise to community” (p. 157), he appears to be using “com-
 
 15. Spiro writes, with respect to this apparent closed-mindedness:  
The disfavor provoked by dual nationality became embedded to the 
point that it was reflexive. One did not need to explain what exactly 
was unacceptable about the status; it simply was. . . . Dual nationality 
was not merely unacceptable. It was an abomination. As the promi-
nent American diplomat George Bancroft wrote to Lord Palmerston in 
1849, states should “as soon tolerate a man with two wives as a man 
with two countries. . . .” (p. 61) (emphasis added). 
 16. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Mono-
gamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 320–
30 (2004) (listing and discussing principles contemporary polys espouse in fa-
vor of polyamory). 
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munity” to mean only those organized or hierarchical entities 
which actually do the exclusionary work that he ascribes to the 
category of community writ large.  
Yet, at the same time, Spiro writes broadly when speaking 
of communities, including “religious” communities in his dis-
cussion of how meaningful communities behave. “Communities 
must be able to define themselves if they are to qualify as 
communities. . . . Religion obviously doesn’t allow for multiple 
affiliations. . . . Most other nonstate affiliations are not so jeal-
ous.” (pp. 154–55). This section highlights the major religious 
communities that do not conform to Spiro’s understanding of 
“religion” as a necessarily exclusionary phenomenon. 
For example, a popular contemporary notion of Indian 
Hinduism stresses an incredible open-endedness of what it 
means to be a “Hindu.” Critically describing this nationalistic 
form of Hinduism, Pratap Bhanu Mehta writes how “being In-
dian means essentially possessing a common ethnicity, which 
[is] name[d] Hindutva. That is what all [Indians supposedly] 
have in common, including Muslims and Christians.”17  
While seemingly open minded, pancommunal, and progres-
sive, Indian political organizations and parties that would be 
characterized as “right-wing” in the American political lexicon 
and experience are the ones that have taken up and popula-
rized this particular articulation of Hinduism. For example, the 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Vishwa Hindu Pari-
shad (VHP) and the politically influential Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP)—all major (and interrelated) right-wing Hindu or-
ganizations—have contributed to the development of this “tole-
rant” Hindu nationalist agenda.18 They do so in order to count 
as many people as possible as Hindu, in the process construct-
ing a demographically Hindu-majority India. As Christophe 
Jaffrelot summarizes: 
The logic of these efforts at [Hindu] unity [relies on the notion that] 
Hinduism was . . . facing a threat from the proselytizing religions, 
which lacked its ‘tolerance’ and imperiled its majority status. The sit-
uation demanded the eradication of untouchability—an important in-
centive to conversion—and the unification of Hinduism in a coherent 
 
 17. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Secularism and the Identity Trap, in WILL 
SECULAR INDIA SURVIVE? 72, 80 (Mushirul Hasan ed., 2004) (emphasis added). 
 18. See generally CHRISTOPHE JAFFRELOT, THE HINDU NATIONALIST 
MOVEMENT IN INDIA (1993) (discussing, inter alia, how the Hindutva national-
ist movement is associated with hard-line conservative groups in India). 
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whole. These two remedies were . . . proposed in reaction to the cul-
tural characteristics of the [Christian and Muslim] ‘aggressors.’19 
As Mehta and Jaffrelot’s combined analyses suggest, Hin-
du nationalists’ tolerance is an uncertain weapon. On the one 
hand, this tolerance attempts to erase certain social divisions. 
On the other hand, the ultimate goal of this kind of tolerance is 
to endow the Hindu community with a strength by which it can 
enforce other social divisions and hierarchies. Thus, it is com-
mon to find Hindu nationalists criticizing and taking action 
(violent and otherwise) against those communities that are 
“communal” (i.e. disagreeable) enough to cast their lot outside 
of the capacious, all-loving, and “tolerant” Hindu community. 
Secularism is also part of this Hindu nationalist tolerance 
project. In contemporary India, “communal” is a buzzword for 
“Muslim,” and Hindu nationalists’ understanding and en-
dorsement of a countervailing “secularism” allows them to be, 
as they are elsewhere, simultaneously progressive and Islamo-
phobic.20 For example, the BJP continually asserts in its elec-
toral campaigns that it is the only party that has the will to 
enact a “Uniform Civil Code,” thereby replacing the extant 
practice of enforcing different family laws for each of India’s 
different religious communities with the practice of administer-
ing one secular family law code for all of India’s citizens, no 
matter what their religion. While seemingly progressive in its 
elimination of “separate but equal” family law codes, Rina 
Verma Williams describes the flip side to this Hindu national-
ist promise: “In the 1980s, religious identity for the Muslim 
community became virtually coterminous with the preservation 
of their personal law. For some Hindus, in turn, Indian nation-
al identity became virtually coterminous with forcing the Mus-
lim community to give up their personal law.”21 More to the 
point, Brenda Cossman and Ratna Kapur describe this double-
edged articulation of “Indian” national identity in the following 
manner: “At best, it is a call to assimilate [religious] minorities 
into the ostensibly more tolerant fabric of Hinduism; and at its 
more extreme, it is a call simply to destroy them.”22 
 
 19. Id. at 347. 
 20. See id. at 105 (citing an address to the Indian Congress pleading that 
congressional candidates represent a “noncommunal and secular State” in op-
position to “communal bodies which have an entirely different approach”). 
 21. RINA VERMA WILLIAMS, POSTCOLONIAL POLITICS AND PERSONAL 
LAWS: COLONIAL LEGAL LEGACIES AND THE INDIAN STATE 127 (2006). 
 22. BRENDA COSSMAN & RATNA KAPUR, SECULARISM’S LAST SIGH? 
HINDUTVA AND THE (MIS)RULE OF LAW 47 (1999). 
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To be fair, many people in India, whether Hindu or non-
Hindu, find the Hindu nationalist conflation of Hinduism, to-
lerance, and secularism simplistic and offensive.23 Neverthe-
less, it is difficult to conclude, as Spiro would, that the frighte-
ningly inclusive (if ironic) “love will conquer all” strategy 
pursued by right-wing Hindu organizations has weakened Hin-
du sentiment and community in India. While the BJP has cer-
tainly suffered political setbacks recently, it would be incredi-
bly premature to predict its demise or the demise of other right-
wing Hindu organizations. 
To the extent that one is worried about hegemonic forms of 
Hinduism, one can emphasize either their communal under-
pinnings and implications or, alternatively, offer examples of 
the inclusive “secularity” of their adversaries, including Islam 
itself. Here, I will follow the latter strategy, particularly be-
cause Islam offers many examples of religious thought and 
practice that challenge the idea that religion requires a sharp-
ly-defined “us” and “them” to provide a meaningful experience. 
In contrast to the popular Western view of Islam that 
stresses its atavistic hostility to nonbelievers, at many mo-
ments in its history, Islam has been crucially inclusive. For in-
stance, in the mid-twentieth century, many leading Muslim 
theologians in South Asia resisted the movement for a global 
“Muslim homeland” in Pakistan because they wished to see a 
postcolonial, multireligious India thrive. Among these religious 
thinkers was Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, the principal of 
the religious seminary at Deoband (India), a place which has 
received much attention after September 11th for its alleged 
role in fostering “extremist” Islam around the world. Concern-
ing Islam’s tolerance of members of other religious faiths, and 
the ability of Muslims and non-Muslims to join together in the 
larger enterprise of qaum (nation), Madani famously wrote: 
Islam comprises the principles that underlie the rectitude of doctrin-
al, practical, and moral matters. . . . We must now consider whether 
Islam . . . allows, on the basis of shared residence, race, color, and 
 
 23. That being said, this conflation has become so insidiously widespread 
that one finds it receiving expression even in arenas (including judicial opi-
nions) which operate at some distance from the direct purview of Hindu natio-
nalist politics. See, e.g., Ganpat v. Presiding Officer, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 420, 423–
24 (India) (“Hinduism is a very broad based religion . . . Hinduism is so tole-
rant and Hindu religious practices so varied and eclectic that one would find it 
difficult to say whether one is practicing or professing Hindu religion or not.”). 
For a fuller discussion of this case, see Jeffrey A. Redding, Human Rights and 
Homo-sectuals: The International Politics of Sexuality, Religion, and Law, 4 
NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 436, 463 n.104 (2006). 
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language, a shared nationalism with non-Muslims. . . . To the extent 
that I can understand its laws, [Islam] can live together with non-
Muslims in the same country; it can be at peace with them; it can en-
ter into treaties with them. . . . [Muslims] can interact with [non-
Muslims], participate in matters of joy and grief, and dine with 
them. . . . There are countless laws and principles governing social or-
der in Islam that reveal its consideration for and tolerance of others 
and that are not found in other religions. . . . But this flexibility does 
not imply weakness.24 
Madani’s impassioned and influential vision of a religious-
ly-grounded, inclusive nation is important not only in itself, but 
also for the vigorous and hostile reactions it elicited from other 
prominent Islamic thinkers of the time. Notably, Syed Abul Ala 
Maududi25 characterized Madani’s views as “sin,” and argued 
that Muslims constituted a nation separate from India’s other 
religious communities.26 Not surprisingly, Maududi also fa-
mously argued for the creation of an Islamic state in South 
Asia, where Allah would be “Ruler, Dictator (āmir) and Legisla-
tor.”27 As undesirable and unlikely as the creation of such a 
separate Islamic state seemed to many Indians—including Ma-
dani—a version of such a state came to pass when Pakistan 
was carved out of British-colonial India in 1947. Madani was 
not successful in preventing the establishment of Pakistan, and 
he remained in India after 1947.28 Maududi, in contrast, moved 
to Pakistan two weeks after the partition of British-colonial In-
dia in 1947. 
Madani and Maududi’s disagreements over the meaning 
and implications of nation (qaum) clearly affected their deci-
sions where to reside in postpartition South Asia. In this re-
 
 24. MUHAMMAD QASIM ZAMAN, THE ULAMA IN CONTEMPORARY ISLAM 34 
(2002) (translating and quoting HUSAIN AHMAD MADANI, MUTTAHIDA 
QAWMIYYAT AUR ISLAM (1938)). 
 25. Both Maududi and Muhammad Iqbal, the noted poet-philosopher and 
advocate of Pakistan, severely criticized Madani’s views on qaum. Iqbal went 
so far as to accuse Madani of engaging in innovative, heretical thinking akin 
to that of the Ahmadis, an extremely controversial Muslim sect that came into 
being in the nineteenth century. Id. at 35. This sect’s contentiousness stems 
from its nineteenth-century founder’s characterization of himself as something 
like a post-Muhammad (Muslim) “prophet.”  
 26. See IRFAN AHMAD, ISLAMISM AND DEMOCRACY IN INDIA: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI 60–61 (2009).  
 27. Id. at 65 (translating and quoting Maududi).  
 28. For more information on Madani’s life and thought, see generally  
Barbara Metcalf, Observant Muslims, Secular Indians: The Political Vision of 
Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, 1938–1957, in FROM THE COLONIAL TO THE 
POSTCOLONIAL: INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN TRANSITION 96 (Dipesh Chakrabarty 
et al. eds., 2007). 
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spect, it is difficult to dissociate each thinker’s views on the 
“nation” from their thoughts on the “state” or, alternatively, the 
“nation-state.”29 
This, in turn, raises the question of how notions and prac-
tices of “the Islamic state” square with Spiro’s views as to the 
necessarily inclusive nature of “meaningful” religious commu-
nities. Considering the Islamic state is important to assessing 
Spiro’s work for two reasons. First, given Spiro’s ambitious (if 
under-theorized) use of the term “community,” it would seem 
that any contemporary religious state could be considered a 
type of (religious) community. Second, even if one contemplates 
the possibility that Spiro intends only an organized, hierarchic-
al entity when he writes of “community,”30 the contemporary 
Islamic state may be the most organized and hierarchical entity 
available for analysis within the Muslim tradition. Indeed, neg-
lecting to consider the modern-day Islamic state leaves one 
otherwise with a notoriously nonhierarchical Islam and an Is-
lam which incorporates an incredible diversity of belief and 
practice within itself. With these two considerations in mind 
then, to not examine the Islamic states of today’s world, and 
how they do or do not exclude non-Muslims, would likely ex-
clude Islam from any critical analysis of Spiro’s ideas as to the 
antecedents of meaningful community. I believe that this would 
be unwise. 
With respect to contemporary Islamic states, Pakistan is 
particularly instructive because of its historical raison d’être as 
 
 29. In this respect, Madani’s views as to “Islāmiyat” or “the domain of re-
ligion where Islam was supreme” impacted his views as to “hindustāniyat”—
the domain where “worldly affairs . . . reigned high.” AHMAD, supra note 26, at 
21. As a result, for Madani, “Muslims qua Muslims could flourish under a se-
cular state.” Id. While Madani’s ideas here sound something like an endorse-
ment of American-style “separation of church and state,” one should avoid the 
temptation to view his intentions vis-à-vis qaum as belonging purely to the 
secular realm. Indeed, from Madani’s writing, while it is clear that he at-
tached Islamic religio-legal significance to the idea of milla, or religion-specific 
community (e.g. the Muslim community, the Hindu community), he also at-
tached a similar significance to the pan-faith qaum (or “nation”). For Madani, 
while the idea of qaum had a political role and significance that was different 
than that of milla, both categories of community were important Islamic reli-
gio-legal concepts. As Muhammad Qasim Zaman explains, “[t]hat Hindus and 
Muslims could not form a single nation was to [Madani] as insidious a notion 
as the idea that the Muslims of India were separate from the global Muslim 
community.” ZAMAN, supra note 24, at 33. 
 30. Spiro suggests this in the religious context by observing that 
“[a]dherents of religions do not get to vote on doctrine, although democratic-
type procedures may prevail at some levels, as when cardinals select a pontiff ” 
(p. 147). The Catholic premise of these observations seems clear here. 
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a Muslim homeland and its contemporary importance and 
prominence. Many observers have noted Pakistan’s shoddy 
treatment of religious minorities, including Hindus, Christians, 
and Ahmadis.31 In addition, many commentators have argued 
that this poor treatment is no surprise given that Pakistan is, 
at least in some important respects, an Islamic state.32 Indeed, 
more generally, the claim seems to be that all confessional 
states—whether they be Sunni Muslim (e.g. Saudi Arabia), 
Shi’a Muslim (Iran), Jewish (Israel), or Hindu (e.g. pre-2008 
Nepal)—present, by definition, serious problems for the equita-
ble treatment of religious nonconformists.33 Echoing Spiro, the 
argument seems to be that modern-day religious states neces-
sarily erect barriers to nonbelievers while also making it un-
comfortable for the unfaithful to remain. 
One distinct possibility overlooked by this sort of argu-
ment, however, is that any contemporary confessional state’s 
poor treatment of religious minorities may be more the conse-
quence of each confessional entity’s status as a modern-day 
state than it is a consequence of the religion with which each is 
associated. In this respect, it is perhaps no coincidence that the 
two South Asian religious organizations which have historically 
attracted the most Western commentary and fearful concern—
the (Muslim) Jamaat-e-Islami and the (Hindu) Bharatiya Jana-
ta Party—have often (con)fused their religious ambitions with 
 
 31. See, e.g., Pakistan: Massacre of Minority Ahmadis: Attack on Hospital 
Treating Victims Shows How State Inaction Emboldens Extremists, HUM. R. 
WATCH, June 1, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/05/31/Pakistan 
-massacre-minority-ahmadis. 
 32. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PAKISTAN: USE AND ABUSE OF 
THE BLASPHEMY LAWS 1 (1994) (linking Pakistan’s misuse of laws criminaliz-
ing blasphemy to the Islamization of Pakistan’s legal infrastructure). 
 33. For example, see Ofrit Liviatin’s description of how  
[u]pon its establishment, Israel was proclaimed a “Jewish” and a 
“Democratic” state. As subsequent political compromises led to a 
growing convergence of state and religious affairs, this aspiring duali-
ty became highly contested, generating deep and enduring social ten-
sions. As far as the Jewish majority is concerned, a robust Jewish es-
tablishment has been set up to enforce an Orthodox monopoly on 
Jewish life in Israel. Despite the limited numerical size of Orthodox 
Jews within the Jewish population, Orthodox Jewish norms regulate 
matters of personal status for all Israeli Jews regardless of their ac-
tual religious identification. This situation increasingly polarized the 
relationship between the Ultra-Orthodox and Orthodox communities 
on the one hand, and the secular and non-Orthodox Jewish communi-
ties on the other, portrayed by a growing number of scholars as a kul-
turkampf. 
Ofrit Liviatin, Judicial Activism and Religion-Based Tensions in India and 
Israel, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 583, 601–02 (2009). 
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ambitions vis-à-vis a totalitarian modern-day state. On the one 
hand then, one finds Syed Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of 
the Jamaat-e-Islami, arguing that Allah must be the “Ruler, 
Dictator (āmir) and Legislator” of his desired Islamic state.34 
And on the other hand, one finds BJP parliamentarians ar-
guing threateningly that “[i]f you have a State, you must have 
one attitude, one behaviour, one pattern of thinking.”35 
Comparing Hindu-majority (though officially secular)36 In-
dia and Muslim-majority (and officially Islamic)37 Pakistan is 
instructive for the purposes of this Review. Despite their di-
verging religious identifications, these two historically-linked 
states possess similarly poor human rights records with respect 
to their respective religious minorities. Moreover, looking 
beyond the secular/religious professions of each state’s legal 
system, both states strongly resemble each other in their go-
vernance practices. This is true both at the higher levels of go-
vernance (e.g. the governing structures that each state’s consti-
tution puts into place), and also at the lower levels (e.g. how the 
police operate). A number of scholars have argued that India 
and Pakistan both inherited repressive governance practices 
from their shared British colonial experience.38 This provoca-
 
 34. See AHMAD, supra note 26, at 65. It is important to emphasize that 
while Ahmad’s work does discuss motivating ideas that were important at the 
founding of the Jamaat-e-Islami, the larger focus of his ethnographic work is 
to demonstrate how and why the Indian wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami has, over 
the years, moved from rejecting to embracing and participating in India’s 
democratic and secular political system. 
 35. 13 PARL. DEB., LOK SABHA 10 (Synopsis of Debates) (2002) (India) 
(statement of M.P. Anadi Sahu), available at http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/ 
lsdeb/ls13/ses10/190702.html. 
 36. INDIA CONST. pmbl. (declaring India to be a “sovereign socialist secu-
lar democratic republic” (emphasis added)). 
 37. See, e.g., PAKISTAN CONST. (1973), art. 2 (“Islam shall be the State re-
ligion of Pakistan.”). For a longer discussion of different aspects of Pakistan’s 
Islamic governance, see generally Jeffrey A. Redding, Constitutionalizing Is-
lam: Theory and Pakistan, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 759 (2004). 
 38. See, e.g., AYESHA JALAL, DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM IN 
SOUTH ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 4 (1995) (“Only die-
hard protagonists of difference in the highest common denominator of the des-
tinies of subcontinental states and polities would deny that democratic repre-
sentation in India and military dictatorship in Pakistan and Bangladesh have 
of late beset them with analogous, if not similar, sets of problems and chal-
lenges.”); IMTIAZ OMAR, EMERGENCY POWERS AND THE COURTS IN INDIA AND 
PAKISTAN 2–4 (2002); Anil Kalhan, Constitution and ‘Extraconstitution’: 
Emergency Powers in Postcolonial Pakistan and India, in EMERGENCY 
POWERS IN ASIA: EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY 89, 91 (Victor V. Ramraj 
& Arun K. Thiruvengadam eds., 2010) (“[While] India and Pakistan both have 
been governed by constitutions incorporating commitments to democracy and 
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tive claim, on which space limitations do not permit further 
elaboration, would support the conclusion that it is this inhe-
ritance of strong and trigger-happy bureaucracies that is re-
sponsible for each state’s shoddy treatment of religious “outsid-
ers” rather than each state’s confessional status.  
Other theorists have examined the dark underbelly of the 
modern-day state outside of the specific dynamics of South 
Asia. For example, both Robert Cover and Will Kymlicka have 
questioned the healthiness and robustness of exclusive (nation-
al) communities. In his seminal work, Cover highlighted the 
hegemonic and jurispathic ambitions of contemporary states, 
including the United States.39 Kymlicka’s work has characte-
rized the widespread contemporary desire for national purity 
and unity as essentially paranoid in cause and effect.40 In these 
accounts, religion (or its absence) seems to have little explana-
tory power on its own with respect to how a community will 
react to and deal with “deviants.” If the community operates 
like a modern-day state, however, intolerance and violent re-
pression seem all too possible. 
 
fundamental rights, both countries’ legal frameworks build upon colonial-era 
laws, institutions, and norms that were designed not to facilitate democratic 
governance and accountability, but rather to establish and maintain centra-
lized control by the executive.”).  
 39. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 
(1983) for his argument that  
[legal i]nterpretation always takes place in the shadow of coercion. 
And from this fact we may come to recognize a special role for courts. 
Courts, at least the courts of the state, are characteristically ‘juris-
pathic.’ It is remarkable that in myth and history the origin of and 
justification for a court is rarely understood to be the need for law. 
Rather, it is understood to be the need to suppress law, to choose be-
tween two or more laws, to impose upon laws a hierarchy. It is the 
multiplicity of laws, the fecundity of the jurisgenerative principle, 
that creates the problem to which the court and the state are the so-
lution. 
 40. Kymlicka argues that “Western” and “Eastern” nations have diverged 
in how they view the threat of antinational secessionist movements in Will 
Kymlicka, Federalism and Secession: At Home and Abroad, 13 CAN. J. L. & 
JURIS. 207, 218 (2000). Kymlicka’s larger argument here is that “Western” 
states in particular have largely managed to contain secessionist movements 
by their national minorities because these states have learned to view such 
movements as part of the give-and-take of liberal democracy, and thus as 
something they have to permit instead of fear and repress. See id. at 214, 223. 
Conversely, “[i]n [Eastern and Central European countries] . . . it is widely be-
lieved that ‘the secession of foreign-speaking or minority territories forebodes 
national death.’” Id. at 223 (quoting Istvan Bibo’s work). Thus, while Kymlicka 
identifies a difference between “West” and “East” in this work, it is not a dif-
ference predicated on religion (or its absence). 
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The focus here on Islam’s capacity to incorporate “differ-
ence” within a larger religious outlook, thereby allowing both 
nonbelievers and communal dissidents a meaningful stake 
within the religion, is an important counter example to Spiro’s 
view of meaningful religious community. However, Islam is 
hardly unique in this respect. Anglicanism also offers a blurred 
account of who counts as “us” versus “them.” Even as fierce con-
flict about the ordination of openly gay priests has broken out 
within the global Anglican community, this conflict has not re-
sulted in stereotypical excommunications. Instead, new and in-
teresting debates and realignments are developing within the 
Anglican community. As the next section discusses, the Angli-
can experience not only serves as a reminder of the blurred in-
determinacy of much religious community membership, but al-
so of the healthy nature of many religious—and national—
communities’ internal debates. 
B. RELIGIOUS PURITY? 
This section contests Spiro’s overly generalized account of 
meaningful religious community—and, by Spiro’s extension, 
meaningful national community—by discussing another reli-
gious community which does not conform to Spiro’s view. The 
previous section argued that a sharp distinction between an 
“us” and a “them” is actually not constitutive of many major re-
ligious traditions, including both Hinduism and Islam. This 
section adds to this point by highlighting the fact that a radi-
cally diverse “us” is perfectly consistent with robust, meaning-
ful religious community. This time, however, the context and 
example for this point will come from Christianity. 
When Spiro discusses whether and how citizenship norms 
will migrate from state to nonstate spheres in the twenty-first 
century, he writes that “direct transference of democratic 
theory and citizenship principles proves difficult across the 
public/private divide” (p. 149), and that “liberal democratic 
theory does not always lend itself to nonstate application” (p. 
149). In Spiro’s account, religion is a perfect example of the 
“private,” nongovernmental world, and the application of liber-
al governance norms to religious communities is likely to be es-
pecially problematic. Spiro notes that “[a]dherents of religions 
do not get to vote on doctrine, although democratic-type proce-
dures may prevail at some levels, as when cardinals select a 
pontiff” (p. 149). Furthermore, religions also control member-
ship entry and exit in ways which violate liberal political norms 
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(pp. 151–55). Nonetheless, for Spiro, all this is understandable 
(and perhaps enviable) as a mechanism to enforce community 
solidarity and strength (p. 154). After all, “[d]ifference is what 
community is all about, at a constitutive level. It is what builds 
those bonds of loyalty, of allegiance, of a willingness to sacrifice 
for fellow members” (p. 156). 
The worldwide Anglican Church (or “Communion,” as it is 
officially known) provides an excellent counterexample to Spi-
ro’s argument that meaningful religious community is a func-
tion of internal community conformity, which is itself the prod-
uct of exclusionary membership practices. The Anglican 
Church has been no stranger to intense internal debates. In the 
past thirty years, memorable debates have broken out within 
the church over the ordination of female priests and, more re-
cently, the ordination of a sexually-active, openly homosexual 
man as a bishop.41 However, the church has demonstrated that 
the internal diversity of thought and practice that results from 
its inclusiveness can provide a meaningful religious and com-
munity experience. 
With respect to the more recent debate over gay bishops, 
the (Anglican) Episcopal Diocese of New Hampshire ordained 
Gene Robinson as its bishop in 2003.42 Robinson had lived 
openly with another man for almost twenty years and had pre-
viously divorced his wife after acknowledging his homosexuali-
ty to both himself and her.43 His ordination as a bishop reso-
nated globally, because it was the first ordination as Anglican 
bishop of a sexually-active, openly homosexual person,44 and 
because it occurred in the midst of an already intense debate 
concerning sexuality within the worldwide Anglican Church.45 
 
 41. See Mary Frances Schjonberg, Sexuality Discussions Bring Lambeth 
Bishops to Frank Conversation, EPISCOPAL LIFE ONLINE (July 31, 2008), 
http://www.episcopalchurch.org/79901_99622_ENG_HTM.htm. 
 42. Episcopalians Formally Ordain Second Gay Bishop, ALL HEADLINE 
NEWS (May 17, 2010), http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7018716641. 
 43. Lawrence Ferber, Bishop V. Gene Robinson: The Right Reverend—The 
Gay Bishop Doing God’s Work, PASSPORT ONLINE (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www 
.passportmagazine.com/businessclass/BishopVGeneRobinson.php. 
 44. And just recently, a lesbian woman was ordained by the Episcopal 
Church in California, again provoking intense debate within the global Angli-
can community. See William Crowley, Mary Glasspool: Anglicanism’s First Les-
bian Bishop, WILL & TESTAMENT: WILLIAM CRAWLEY’S BLOG (May 14, 2010, 
11:07 GMT), http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/ni/2010/05/mary_glasspool_anglicanisms_ 
fi.html. 
 45. See, e.g., Resolution I.10: Human Sexuality, LAMBETH CONFERENCE 
RESOLUTIONS (1998), available at http://www.lambethconference.org/resolutions/ 
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In response to Robinson’s ordination, many Anglican 
churches, both within and outside the United States, protested 
loudly, claiming that Robinson’s ordination was a perversion of 
Biblical teachings and law. The opposition was so intense that 
the Church did not extend Robinson an invitation to the most-
recent (2008) “Lambeth Conference,” the decennial gathering of 
Anglican bishops in Canterbury, England.46 As well, a group of 
approximately 250 Anglican bishops boycotted the 2008 Lam-
beth Conference, and instead held an alternative meeting in 
Jerusalem styled as the Global Anglican Future Conference (or 
“GAFCON”).47 As one of these boycotters explained, his non-
attendance in Canterbury was a result of his feeling that “[t]he 
Anglican Church is being destroyed by false teaching of the Bi-
ble on issues such as sexuality.”48 In addition, both individual 
American Episcopalian churches and even some dioceses who 
have disagreed with Robinson’s ordination have oriented them-
selves away from the American Episcopalian church seeking 
association with the like-minded Anglican bishops and provinc-
es in Africa and South America.49 
On first blush, this recent (and ongoing) Anglican debate 
over homosexuality seems like the perfect example of the sort 
of intense line drawing that Spiro associates with “meaningful” 
religious communities. Instead of waiting to see their church’s 
doctrines be further “watered down” by contemporary attitudes 
regarding sexuality, a group of bishops has proactively circled 
their wagons, refusing a certain interaction with those of their 
peers they perceive to be homosexual-friendly. 
 
1998/1998-1-10.cfm; see also Timeline: Battling for the Priesthood, BBC NEWS 
(Aug. 5, 2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3123115.stm (providing a 
timeline of recent debates concerning gender and sexuality within Anglican 
and other Christian churches). 
 46. See Riazat Butt, Gay ‘Climate of Controversy’ Clouds Anglican Gather-
ing, GUARDIAN Jan. 21, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/jan/21/ 
religion.gayrights. 
 47. See Robert Pigott, Bishops Turning Back on Lambeth, BBC NEWS, 
Jun. 25, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7474525.stm. 
 48. See Anglican Conservatives Form Group, BBC NEWS (Jun. 29, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7479735.stm (quoting Reverend Rod 
Thomas). 
 49. See, e.g., Mary Frances Schjonberg, Pittsburgh: Episcopal Church Pe-
titions to Join Property Case, Wants Duncan to Vacate Offices, EPISCOPAL LIFE 
ONLINE (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.episcopalchurch.org/81803_105094_ENG_ 
HTM.htm; Fort Worth: More Diocesan Leaders Seek Realignment, EPISCOPAL 
LIFE ONLINE (Sep. 11, 2008), http://www.episcopalchurch.org/81803_100590_ 
ENG_HTM.htm; US Anglicans Join Kenyan Church, BBC NEWS (Aug. 30, 
2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6970093.stm.  
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But this is where the utility of Spiro’s discussion stops. 
When interpreting religious conflict, as with all conflict, it is 
just as important to note the silences and points of agreement 
as it is to highlight the points of contention. In this respect, it 
should be noted that the “mainstream” Anglican Church has 
not excommunicated any member of the organized  
antihomosexual “faction.” In fact, an important Anglican 
Church document from 2004, the Windsor Report, emphasized 
that  
[the Anglican Church] need[s] to develop the habit, and thence the 
virtue, of that charity which listens intensely and with good will to 
widely different expressions of sincerely held Christian theology, at 
the levels both of method and of content. As a Communion, we need a 
common forum for debate, a common table to which we can bring our 
questions for a proper family discussion. 
. . . . 
Where a fresh wave of scholarship generates ideas which are per-
ceived as a threat to something the Church has always held dear, it is 
up to the scholars concerned, on the one hand, to explain how what is 
now proposed not only accords with but actually enhances the central 
core of the Church’s faith. And it is up to the Church, on the other 
hand, not to reject new proposals out of hand, but to listen carefully, 
to test everything, and to be prepared to change its mind if and when 
a convincing case is made.50 
In response to statements of faith like these, as well as the 
recent discussions at the (boycotted) 2008 Lambeth Conference, 
the antihomosexual (GAFCON) group has written:  
[We] remain[ ] a gospel movement. [We are] far from saying that [our] 
membership [represents] the only true Anglicans or the only gospel 
people in the Anglican Communion. We thank God that this is not the 
case. But [our] movement recognises the acute spiritual dangers of a 
compromised theology and aims to be a resource and inspiration for 
those who wish to defend and promote the biblical gospel. 
. . . . 
Given that some esteemed colleagues from the Global South have 
strongly commended the Windsor [Report] Process to us, we are re-
luctant to say that it cannot work. But there is nothing new here such 
as to make us hesitate from the course we are taking, given the ur-
gency of the situations with which we are dealing and the realities al-
ready on the ground. As [these colleagues] themselves remark, ‘the 
Anglican Communion as a communion of ordered churches is at the 
probable brink of collapse.’ We warmly appreciate the good words 
which they have written about GAFCON and look forward to co-
 
 50. LAMBETH COMMISSION ON COMMUNION, THE WINDSOR REPORT 22–23, 
30 (2004), available at http://www.aco.org/windsor2004/downloads/windsor2004full 
.pdf. 
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operation with [our colleagues] in the future as we ourselves try to 
avoid that collapse and renew the Communion.51 
Clearly, there is vociferous disagreement within the Angli-
can Church over matters of gender, homosexuality, and also the 
Anglican Church’s intertwined legacies of racism and colonial-
ism. That being said, these debates are also alive and well in 
the larger world, and the statements, threats, reconciliations, 
and compromises that are emanating from different quarters of 
the worldwide Anglican Church look very much like the ordi-
nary stuff of usual (if fierce) politics. While it is impossible to 
predict the direction that this Anglican debate will take, it re-
mains an internal debate. Moreover, any permanent rupture of 
the larger Anglican Church (or Communion) would appear to 
represent for everyone a serious failure of (meaningful) reli-
gious outlook and community-oriented practice.52 
III.  FEDERAL COMMUNITIES   
The Anglican Church is divided on issues that elicit deep 
feeling and emotion from church members of every persuasion. 
However, that being said, an all-out civil war has been avoided, 
and the opposing factions maintain contact and communication 
and the possibility of understanding (even if disagreeing).53 
Seeing that issues concerning (homo)sexuality are also fractur-
ing many contemporary political communities as well, the An-
glican Church’s experience could be instructive not only in the 
religious realm, but also in the realm of the nation. 
This final Part explores what the conflict resolu-
tion/dissipation mechanisms the Anglican Church has used can 
 
 51. GAFCON Communiqué on Establishment of Primates Council and 
Fellowship, GAFCON (Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.gafcon.org/news/gafcon_ 
communique_on_establishment_of_primates_council_and_fellowship/ [hereinaf-
ter GAFCON Communiqué]. 
 52.  For example, see the following statement by the Lambeth Commis-
sion:  
There remains a very real danger that we will not choose to walk to-
gether. . . . [That being said, o]ur aim throughout has been to work 
not for division but for healing and restoration. The real challenge of 
the gospel is whether we live deeply enough in the love of Christ, and 
care sufficiently for our joint work to bring that love to the world, that 
we will “make every effort to maintain the unity of the Spirit in the 
bond of peace.” (Eph. 4.3). 
LAMBETH COMMISSION ON COMMUNION, supra note 50, at 60. Additionally the 
[Anglican Church’s] primates stated in 2000, “‘[T]o turn from one another 
would be to turn away from the Cross,’ and indeed from serving the world 
which God loves and for which Jesus Christ died.” Id. 
 53. See GAFCON Communiqué, supra note 51; Butt, supra note 46. 
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tell us about religious and national communities and identities. 
In particular, this Part concentrates on the federal structure of 
the Anglican Church, and how the diversity of religious prac-
tice and identity that this religious federalism permits trans-
lates to the political realm and creates the possibility of mea-
ningful, yet nonexclusive and nonconformist, national 
communities and identities. In short, this Part acceptss Spiro’s 
valuable efforts to connect usually disparate discussions of reli-
gious community and national community. But this Part ar-
gues that national communities, like their religious counter-
parts, do not necessarily rely on internal conformity for their 
meaningfulness. Hence to the extent that exclusionary national 
citizenship practices intend to advance internal conformity as a 
means to meaningful national community, these exclusionary 
practices are misdirected. Indeed, following the demonstration 
in Part II that federalist structure and value-pluralism are fea-
tures that can help build meaningful religious communities, 
this Part demonstrates how these same elements can build 
meaningful national communities too. 
The Anglican Church’s debates about sexuality arose, at 
least in part, because federalism was a defining organizational 
principle of the church. Federalism in the Anglican Church 
arose out of the church’s long history of colonization and mis-
sionary activity, which required decentralized authority.54 
 
 54. For a history of the Anglican Church, see generally DAVID L. 
EDWARDS, CHRISTIAN ENGLAND: FROM THE REFORMATION TO THE 18TH 
CENTURY (1983). The federal quality of the Anglican Church refers to the se-
paration of powers that exists between the various geographically-defined An-
glican dioceses and the overarching governance of the worldwide Anglican 
Communion. See COLIN PODMORE, ASPECTS OF ANGLICAN IDENTITY 79–123 
(2005). Originally, the Anglican Church was the religious arm of the British 
Empire, with the English monarch at the head of the church. Consecrated bi-
shops swore an oath of loyalty to the monarch as part of their ordination. E. 
GARTH MOORE & TIMOTHY BRIDEN, MOORE’S INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH 
CANON LAW 20 (2d ed. 1985). 
Loyalist sentiment during the American Revolution had a religious as 
well as patriotic element. Rebelling against the Crown could be seen as heresy 
against the Anglican Church. See id. (rebelling against England as a nation 
involved reneging one’s consecration oath). After the Revolution, King George 
signed into law an act which permitted English bishops to consecrate those 
outside the dominion of the Crown. See PODMORE, supra, at 27.  
With this act, Anglican congregations were empowered to disagree on 
points of doctrine and faith. Diversity of doctrine and practice extended 
throughout the British colonies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
See DAVID L. EDWARDS, CHRISTIAN ENGLAND: FROM THE 18TH CENTURY TO 
THE FIRST WORLD WAR 319–25 (1984) (describing the spread of Anglicanism in 
Jerusalem, Canada, and South Africa). At the same time, members of the An-
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While centrally administered religions, such as Catholicism, 
have also seen controversy over different issues (e.g. ordination 
of female priests and abortion), it is arguably the case that the 
Anglican Church’s federal structure facilitates and encourages 
doctrinal experimentation. This is no different than in political 
communities that are structured along federal lines.55 
The United States is one such federalized political commu-
nity, and a troublesome feature of Spiro’s discussion of the 
American national community is that it diminishes the federa-
lized nature of the American polity and American culture. Spi-
ro’s discussion of state citizenship, largely limited to Chapter 2, 
is superficial and conclusory. For example, writing of Texas, 
Spiro declares, “Take a state such as Texas, which more than 
most states sustains a distinct state-based identity. Anyone 
who moves to Texas can claim state citizenship, which inevita-
bly tends to dilute the identity, especially in the face of sub-
stantial in-migration.”56 (p. 55). In a work about the innova-
tions and evolutions in United States citizenship, one would 
expect a more serious consideration of the dual-track nature of 
U.S. citizenship57 and the diversity of American (state) culture 
and (state) identity.  
With respect to the fifty states, demographic and ethno-
graphic information suggests that state citizenship and state 
community continue to matter in a very real way despite great 
changes in the nation’s economy and legal structure over the 
past two hundred years. For example, despite commonplace no-
tions that territorial state attachments—and, by extension, 
state communities, identities, and cultures—have evaporated 
in a hyper-mobile American populace, demographic data indi-
cates otherwise. For example, 54% of Americans lived in the 
same residence in 2000 as they did in 1995.58 Of the people who 
 
glican Communion maintain contact and meet from time to time at the Lam-
beth Conference to discuss their views about the direction of the Communion. 
Id. at 325.  
 55. But see generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: 
Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980) (arguing 
that a federal structure will not necessarily promote risk-taking and innova-
tion). 
 56. Emphasis added. 
 57. The 14th Amendment not only universalized the norm of birthright 
citizenship with respect to the United States, but also confirmed that persons 
are “citizens . . . of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, 
§ 1 (emphasis added). 
 58. All data in this paragraph are calculated from data found on SOCIAL 
SCIENCE DATA ANALYSIS NETWORK, CENSUS SCOPE: UNITED STATES, 
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did move during this five-year period, 54% of them remained in 
the same county. Of those who moved counties, 53% of them 
moved to a county within the same state. Ultimately, then, only 
8% of Americans moved between states over the five-year pe-
riod, and even then, interstate migration “most frequently oc-
cur[red] over short distances, and most migrants to the six 
highest states came from [adjacent or] nearby states.”59 Moreo-
ver, this “mobility” appears to be significantly decreasing dur-
ing the ongoing economic crisis.60 
Americans, then, do not move around the territorial United 
States all that much. This should not be surprising considering 
that Americans, like other people, have attachments to fami-
lies, schools, and workplaces that are not instantaneously mo-
bile. What is surprising, however, is that Spiro does not recog-
nize how different territorial communities that Americans 
attach themselves to are representative of very different legal, 
cultural, and moral communities within the territorial U.S. In 
particular, recognizing the moral antecedents to different 
states’ policy choices in family law, education, and labor law,61 
 
MIGRATION & IMMIGRATION (2000), http://www.censusscope.org/us/chart_ 
migration.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2010). 
 59. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE-TO-STATE MIGRATION FLOWS: 1995 TO 
2000, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr 
-8.pdf. Measuring American interstate mobility over the long term is difficult 
and, as a result, reliable data of this kind are not easy to obtain. That being 
said, year-to-year mobility data is available for each of the years between 1947 
and 2006. This data is largely consistent with the five-year data presented 
here, while also suggesting that American interstate mobility over the past 
sixty years has, if anything, actually declined. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
ANNUAL GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY RATES, BY TYPE OF MOVEMENT: 1947–2009, 
available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/migration/tab-a-1.pdf. 
 60. See Damien Cave, Recession Slows Population Rise Across Sun Belt, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 25854202. 
 61. For example, same-sex couples have migrated to Massachusetts for 
family reasons, but it would be hard to characterize this move as “just” for 
family and irrelevant from the perspective of “morality.” 
With respect to education, different states’ policies enable (or discourage) 
different educational possibilities. To the extent that one state’s curriculum 
standards include requirements for sex education in elementary school and 
the teaching of evolutionary theory in high-school biology, and another state’s 
curriculum insists on abstinence-only “sex education” and equal time for dis-
cussions of “intelligent design,” one can fairly describe these policy decisions 
as related to “morality.” One can also do the same vis-à-vis states that tolerate 
wide disparities in educational quality between rich and poor school districts. 
State policies also enable (or discourage) different employment possibili-
ties. States have different minimum wage laws, different environmental stan-
dards, different labor and unionization laws, and numerous other public policy 
disparities. And as Spiro points out, all of these different types of laws and pol-
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and also taking a conceptual step back, one should be able to 
recognize how Americans in the contemporary United States 
are members of different moral communities. And these moral 
communities are not ethnic enclaves but the prized units of the 
American federal system itself, i.e. the states. 
Spiro is not alone amongst theorists in wrongly diminish-
ing the importance of the states as sites of moral meaningful-
ness in the contemporary American landscape.62 However, this 
position is increasingly an untenable one in a nation that, like 
the Anglican Church and other religious communities, is facing 
intense debates over issues pertaining to sexuality and love. 
For instance, states are staking out divergent legal positions on 
the issue of same-sex marriage. The era of family law conver-
gence in the United States is over (if it ever really began).63 
This divergence in family law shines an especially critical light 
on Spiro’s reliance on an undifferentiated “American” culture 
when, for example, he describes how immigrants to the United 
States who choose to assimilate “learn the language, [] go to 
school here, [] marry and work; they have become Americans”64 
(p. 17). 
Americans are Americans, certainly, but they are also Mi-
chiganders, Texans, and New Jerseyites. These latter differ-
ences in moral belonging and moral community—of legal and 
moral citizenship—really do matter. By diminishing the states 
in his discussion of U.S. citizenship law, Spiro obscures both 
the possibility and reality of national community that is not 
tightly premised in internal conformity. 
To be sure, diversity amongst the fifty states could be 
greater. For example, it is the case, historically speaking, that 
 
icies have “morality” components, especially in this day of notions like “corpo-
rate responsibility” (p. 147). 
 62. For example, see the discussions of the states in Vicki C. Jackson, Fe-
deralism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 2180 (1998) and Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some 
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994). For further discus-
sion on the moral community aspects of contemporary states, see Jeffrey A. 
Redding, Slicing the American Pie: Federalism and Personal Law, 40 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 941, 954–61, 972–75 (2008).  
 63. For more on the divergence of family law in the United States, see 
Redding, supra note 62, at 975–81. Even where there appears to be legal con-
vergence—for example, forty-eight states forbid same-sex marriage—there are 
important differences in how states effectuate these policy choices. Michigan, 
Tennessee, and Alabama all constitutionally forbid same-sex marriage, yet 
they do so in significantly different ways. Id. at 980–81. 
 64. Emphasis added. 
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the price for admission to the Union has been that polygamy be 
“forever” banned (e.g. Utah). However, it is also true that no 
State is going to be “excommunicated” or “banished” from the 
United States for engaging in controversial and divisive family 
law practices, including same-sex marriage and (coming soon to 
a State near you) legalized polygamy. Instead, what will hap-
pen is that different states will be allowed to enforce different 
laws. Moreover, this maintenance of diversity will not only 
avert potentially fatal civil strife, but it will also be heralded as 
a singular achievement of the “American” political genius. 
Thus, when Spiro hails “America, its system of government, 
and everything else it stands for” (p. 46), it is not clear why he 
appears to exclude federalism. 
The American way is also the Anglican way, and also the 
way of any number of religious communities which do not oper-
ate with the sharp antagonisms that Spiro simplistically as-
sumes. Ultimately, then, while one must sincerely appreciate 
Spiro’s attempt to link discussions of “the political” and “the re-
ligious,” one has to simultaneously lament how he diminishes 
certain kinds of national and religious communities and the 
similarities between them. Neither national nor religious com-
munities necessarily depend on exclusivity and conformity for  
their integrity or meaningfulness. Open borders and pluralism 
can be robust operating principles for both.65 
  CONCLUSION   
Beyond Citizenship is a wide-ranging and important work. 
It is ambitious and provocative, and it pushes at the borders 
demarcating not only scholarly disciplines but also those which 
are erected between “real-world common-sense” and the “mere-
ly theoretical” and “trivial.” Yet, in its eagerness to stretch the 
reader’s imagination, it engages in speculation and relies on 
counterfactuals which are troublesomely counter factual. In 
closing, it is helpful to specifically engage with one of Spiro’s 
counterfactuals, because its creative aspects so vividly encapsu-
lates both the attractive qualities of, and the problems with, 
Spiro’s work more generally. 
 
 65. This is not necessarily opportunistic. Both the United States and the 
Anglican Church stress the importance of a federal structure to each commu-
nity’s self-understanding. The United States would not be the United States 
without federalism and, as the discussion in Part II suggests, the Anglican 
Church would be less Christian if it were to split up over, or smother, its in-
ternal differences. See discussion supra note 50. 
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In Chapter 2, attempting to show how “the domestic citi-
zenship structure” of state citizenship “demonstrates how thin 
citizenship regimes correspond to thin identity constructs” (p. 
54), Spiro imagines the contours and potential implications of a 
counterfactual Maryland citizenship regime: 
Assume that as a condition for citizenship in the state of Maryland, a 
new resident were required to pass a test about Maryland history . . . 
and pay a fee of $100. Assume also that no benefits were to come with 
citizenship status beyond a certificate of naturalization, suitable for 
framing. The upshot, I think, would be a large proportion of newco-
mers not bothering to apply. On one hand, that might marginally 
reinforce the state identity among those who did . . . . To the extent it 
was something that one had to affirmatively seek, as opposed to pas-
sively receive, one would expect only those who entertained some af-
finity and commitment to the state to bother with the hassle and ex-
pense. In this scheme, Marylanders might be more inclined to wear 
the identity on their sleeves. On the other hand, the identity itself 
would emerge as fairly inconsequential, something in the way of the 
Knights of Columbus or other civic associations. (p. 55). 
Spiro’s hypothetical here is imaginative and thought-
provoking (as they are throughout the work). This book does 
not tread tired ground. Yet Spiro’s imagination can also be 
quite troublesome in its tendency to disconnect from ground 
realities. Indeed, Spiro can only assume here that membership 
in the Knights of Columbus “or other civic associations” is fairly 
meaningless, an echo from his simplistic gloss over the nature 
and functioning of “religion” that this Review has extensively 
discussed. He presents no evidence for this claim and ignores 
obvious counterexamples like the ACLU and its well-known 
“card-carrying members.” Moreover, the Knights of Columbus’ 
recent $1 million donation to the pro-Proposition 8, anti-same-
sex marriage campaign in California suggests an alternative 
read on the significance of membership within that (Catholic 
Church-affiliated) civic association.66 
The recent California same-sex marriage debate also illu-
strates the larger shortcoming of Spiro’s work, namely his con-
fidence that the meaningfulness of a community—whether ma-
rital, religious, or national—derives from the ability of that 
community to exclude “outsiders” and enforce internal confor-
mity. In his discussion of community, Spiro telescopes from 
large to small communities, and from religious to national as-
sociations, and then onward to civic and intimate ones. For Spi-
 
 66. See Veronique de Turenne, Knights of Columbus Tip the Balance with 
Big Anti-Gay Marriage Donation, L.A. TIMES L.A. NOW BLOG (Aug. 20, 2008, 
3:49 PM PST), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2008/08/prop-8-post.html. 
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ro, what unites all these groupings is the way in which the 
power to exclude correlates directly with internal coherence 
read as strength and meaningfulness. 
The California marriage debate argues against this easy 
conclusion, however. Certainly, some marriage proponents ar-
gued that the meaningfulness of marriage as an institution 
would diminish if it was opened up broadly to same-sex 
couples. Yet, in response, many people—including many mar-
ried heterosexuals themselves—have argued that the exclusion 
of same-sex couples from the marital club itself diminished the 
transcendent, loving, and honorable qualities of this communal 
institution. For these people, Proposition 8 was “Proposition 
H8,” and California was the latest state (before Arizona earned 
that honor) to earn the unenviable “Hate State” moniker.  
This is all to say that Beyond Citizenship quite admirably 
raises a number of important and intriguing issues about com-
munity belonging and identity generally, and U.S. citizenship 
law and American national identity in particular. These are 
complicated issues, especially right now as the United States is 
experiencing unpredictable change in its internal structuring 
and its external relations. This Review has argued that this 
complexity requires more than axiomatic beliefs which are un-
grounded in social, political, or religious realities. It has also 
sought to reaffirm that most basic of truths: “Once no one is an 
American, no one is an American.” 
